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Abstract 
The specific purpose of the research was to review current policies, practices, and 
procedures for funding and managing Contract Termination Liability within the Department of 
Defense (DoD).  The research proposes alternative approaches for improving the DoD’s ability 
to manage Contract Termination Liability and discusses the resulting effect of each alternative 
on defense acquisition practices.  First, we provide a brief review of regulatory and policy 
guidance on Contract Termination Liability as reflected in the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) and the Financial Management Regulations (FMR).  We then discuss the current 
practices and procedures for funding and managing Contract Termination Liability. Next, we 
present program management challenges and observations and findings based on our research 
of current Contract Termination Liability policies and real-world practices.  A discussion of 
alternative approaches to funding Contract Termination Liability is then presented, including the 
use of Special Termination Cost Clauses (STCC).  Finally, this research concludes with a 
summary and recommendations on how the DoD could improve the policies and practices for 
managing Contract Termination Liability. 
A copy of the complete report is available at the following website: www.acquisitionresearch.org: 
Report Number NPS-CM-06-042 
  




This research paper explores the Department of Defense (DoD) policies and practices 
for managing Contract Termination Liability.  The specific purpose of the research was to review 
current policies, practices, and procedures for funding and managing Contract Termination 
Liability within the DoD.  Alternative approaches for improving the DoD’s ability to manage 
Contract Termination Liability are proposed and the resulting effect of each alternative on 
defense acquisition practices is discussed.  Recommendations on how the DoD could improve 
the policies and practices for managing Contract Termination Liability are provided. 
This research found that the regulations and policies pertaining to the management and 
funding of Contract Termination Liability are inconsistent and subject to interpretation.  Program 
managers, finance and budget managers, and contracting officers have differing interpretations 
of the requirement for funding Contract Termination Liability.  Furthermore, the practices and 
procedures used in defense acquisition program offices reflect this inconsistency. 
A review of current practices and procedures for funding and managing Contract 
Termination Liability and historical data of past contract terminations found that the probability of 
a contract termination for convenience is very small, and program managers’ approaches to 
managing Contract Termination Liability reflects this probability. The normal procedure for 
handling the potential liability associated with a contract terminated for convenience is to 
“budget” for the liability. Then, in coordination with the contractor, the required amount of 
funding is tracked on a regular basis. In this case, budgeting for Termination Liability does not 
mean obligating funds specifically for that purpose.  
Interviews with various acquisition program offices indicate that program managers are 
generally satisfied with the current method for managing Contract Termination Liability because 
the procedure they currently use allows them to keep all of the funding appropriated for their 
program.  Furthermore, program managers are not in favor of a “tax” that would negate the 
requirement to budget for Contract Termination Liability. A tax would deprive them of funds that 
they currently have at their disposal. Additionally, if all programs were taxed, there is a general 
concern that the pooled funds would likely be lost—either the Military Departments (or DoD) 
would use them to solve other problems if they were not required to cover a liability, or 
Congress would look upon the funds that had been set aside as a “slush fund,” making them 
tempting for other uses. 
Interviews also indicated that support for increased use of STCCs is not evident, either 
at the program level or the OMB or Congressional level. Congress has expressed its concern 
through report language. OMB correspondence has indicated that support for more than one 
STCC per service is unlikely.  However, it should be noted that those programs that have 
significant funding problems and/or are concerned about the possibilities of termination do 
support additional use of STCCs. In fact, these programs would prefer to have a STCC that 
covers more cost elements than the standard STCC. 
Finally, this research concluded with the following recommendations for the DoD’s 
management of Contract Termination Liability:  1. Remove the ambiguity and improve the 
consistency in the regulations pertaining to the management of Contract Termination Liability; 2. 
Refrain from imposing a tax system to provide funding for potential Contract Termination 
Liability, and 3. Continue to use STCCs for the larger programs with funding or longevity 
concerns. 
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Regulatory and Policy Guidance 
This section of the research report focuses on the regulatory and policy guidance on 
Termination Liability and the Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC).  The regulatory and 
policy guidance covering Termination Liability (and, specifically, Special Termination Cost 
Clauses (STCC)) is found in the DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) and the 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS).  In addition, the Air Force 
Financial Management Regulation is also discussed as an example of Agency-specific guidance 
on contingent liability.   
 Termination Liability 
The DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) defines Termination Liability as: 
The amount of prepayments that cover payments required by the contract, and any 
damages and costs that may accrue from the cancellation of such contract.  Funds 
prepaid for Termination Liability will convert to cover actual expenditures in the event 
that the contract not be terminated prior to performance completion. Termination Liability 
may not apply to articles/services provided under other authorities of the Foreign 
Assistance Act or AECA. (DoD, 2006c, Vol. 15) 
The Financial Management Regulation (FMR) categorizes Contingent Liabilities (CLs) as 
probable, possible, or remote (DoD, 2006c).  The terms probable, reasonably possible, and 
remote identify three areas within that range as follows: 
1. Probable: The future event or events are likely to occur. 
2. Reasonably possible: The chance of the future event or events occurring is more than 
remote but less than likely. 
3. Remote: The chance of the future event or events occurring is slight. 
Probable CLs must be covered by a commitment of funds. Probable CLs are most likely 
to become actual liabilities. Commitments are not required for possible CLs and should not be 
established for remote CLs (DoD, 2006c, Vol. 4, Ch. 13, pp. 241-242). 
The budgeting for Contingent Liabilities is discussed in the following excerpts taken from 
the DoD Financial Management Regulation: 
 Special Provisions for Determining the Amounts of Commitments  
Contingent Liabilities Remaining Under Outstanding Contracts. There are 
contingent liabilities for price or quantity increases or other variables that cannot be 
recorded as valid obligations in the cases of (1) outstanding fixed-price contracts 
containing escalation, price redetermination, or incentive clauses, or (2) contracts 
authorizing variations in quantities to be delivered, or (3) contracts where allowable 
interest may become payable by the US Government on contractor claims supported by 
written appeals pursuant to the “Disputes” clause contained in the contract (see 
subparagraph 080202.D, below). Amounts to cover these contingent liabilities should be 
carried as outstanding commitments pending determination of actual obligations. The 
amounts of such contingent liabilities, however, need not be recorded at the maximum or 
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ceiling prices under the contracts. Rather, amounts should be committed that are 
estimated conservatively to be sufficient to cover the additional obligations that probably 
will materialize, based upon judgment and experience. In determining the amount to be 
committed, allowances may be made for the possibility of downward price revisions and 
quantity underruns. Each contingent liability shall be supported by sufficient detail to 
facilitate audit. (DoD, 2006c, Vol. 3, Ch. 8, para. 080202)   
 Budgeting for Termination Liability on Incrementally Funded RDT&E 
 Contracts 
The legal requirements of the Anti-deficiency Act and the long-standing policy of not 
committing a successor Congress to a course of action both make it necessary that the 
unliquidated obligation for an incrementally funded, multiple-year contract be sufficient at all 
times to cover the cost of terminating that contract for the convenience of the Government.  
Budgeting to cover Termination Liability will not increase the total amount budgeted for 
the program. It will require that the distribution of funds by fiscal year be shifted more towards 
the earlier years of the contract than if funds had been budgeted only to cover the actual bill to 
be paid each year. The distribution of funds by fiscal year shall be such that, if a contract is 
terminated at any point during the fiscal year, all termination costs can be financed from the 
unliquidated obligation on the contract without recourse to reprogramming of funds, 
supplemental appropriations, or awaiting the appropriation of funds for the succeeding fiscal 
year’s funding increment. All programs shall adhere to this policy with the following two 
exceptions, both of which are to be used rarely. 
a. Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC). DoD FAR Parts 249.50170 and 252.249-7000 
permit the use of STCC in fixed-price incentive contracts and incrementally funded cost 
reimbursement contracts. If contracts containing an STCC are terminated before 
completion, the special termination charges are covered by the unobligated balance of 
the applicable appropriation, subject to any congressional approval required for 
reprogramming. The extent to which the STCC can be used is limited to the ability of the 
Service or Agency to cover expected termination costs from unobligated balances. A 
recordable obligation under the STCC arises when the contract is actually terminated. If 
a proposed STCC would require an above-threshold reprogramming action when a 
program is terminated, the approval to use the STCC shall be obtained from the USD 
(Comptroller) before the contract or contract modification is awarded. All STCCs, 
regardless of dollar amount, require prior notification of the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees. 
b. Statutory Waivers. The Department is not required to budget for, or obligate funds 
sufficient to cover, Termination Liability in connection with an incrementally funded 
RDT&E contract if Congress has expressly exempted the program or contract from that 
requirement. When this situation arises, however, the budget exhibits for the program 
shall clearly indicate the value of the unfunded Termination Liability by year for the 
current year, budget year, and the outyears covered by the FYDP. (DoD, 2006c, Vol. 2A, 
Ch. 1, para. 010214) 
Termination Liability is considered a contingent liability since adequate funds must be 
committed to cover the liabilities resulting from the termination of contracts, including any 
potential or Contingent Liabilities (Gill, 2003).   
The DoD FMR explains Contingent Liabilities as follows: 
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Contingent Liability—The term has two meanings. As a budgetary term, it represents 
variables that cannot be recorded as valid obligations. Such variables include (1) 
outstanding fixed-price contracts containing escalation, price redetermination, or 
incentive clauses, or (2) contracts authorizing variations on quantities to be delivered, or 
(3) contracts where allowable interest may become payable by the US Government on 
contractor claims supported by written appeals pursuant to the "DISPUTES" clause 
contained in the contract. As a proprietary accounting term, it represents an obligation, 
relating to a past transaction or other event or condition that may arise in consequence, 
as a future event now deemed possible but not probable. When the liability is 
determined to be possible, but not probable, the potential liability is disclosed as a 
footnote to the financial statements. When the potential liability becomes probable, it is 
recorded in the accounts as a current liability or a reduction of an asset. The budget 
definition is the preferred usage. (DoD, 2006c, Vol. 15) 
Thus, according to DoD FMR, Volume 2A, Chapter 1, "all termination costs can be 
financed from the unliquidated obligation on the contract without recourse to reprogramming of 
funds, supplemental appropriations, or awaiting the appropriation of funds for the succeeding 
fiscal year's funding increment" (2006c).  The two exemptions to this are a Special termination 
Cost Clause (STCC) and a Statutory Waiver.  
In addition, Volume 3, Chapter 8, Section 080512 of the DoD FMR states that in the 
case of termination of a contract, the contract shall be decreased to an amount that is sufficient 
to meet the settlement costs under the termination. 
The Air Force Material Command (AFMC) Financial Management Reference System 
(2005, February) provided more detailed guidance on funding termination costs.  The AFMC 
FMRS states the following concerning funding termination costs: 
The funded activity should commit the estimated funds to cover the expected contingent 
liability (CL).  This estimated CL amount is in excess of the contract awarded amount 
recorded as an obligation. The financial manager must record commitments for CLs 
against the applicable FY and appropriation cited on the contract.  Normally, funds for 
CLs are maintained locally. Funds are committed for a contingent liability at the time of 
contract award, based on the amount provided by the contracting officer [...]. 
Commitments are not recorded for STCC or contingent termination liabilities.  
Obligations are recorded when the action to terminate is taken. (AFMC, 2005, February)  
The AFMC FMRS further states that funds are committed for all “probable” CLs (funding 
for “possible” or “remote” CLs is not necessary) as defined in a matrix.  “The CL Matrix is used 
to identify, categorize according to probability, and track CLs throughout the life of a contract [...] 
must be reported to SAF/FM semi-annually” (AFMC, 2005, February). 
As indicated above, the DoD FMR refers to two exceptions to the policy of budgeting for 
Termination Liability.  These include the Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC) and the 
Statutory Waiver.  These will be discussed below. 
 Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC) 
Regulatory and policy guidance related to the use of Special Termination Cost Clauses 
is found in the DoD FMR  (Section: “Budgeting for Termination Liability on Incrementally Funded 
RDT&E Contracts,” p. 3) and the DoD FAR.   
  
                  Acquisition Research: creating synergy for informed change        - 414 - 
 
 
Although the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 49 provides guidance on 
contract terminations, the Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS) provides the guidance and 
prescribes the clause specifically for Special Termination Costs.  The DFARS guidance at 
249.501-70 states the following: 
249.501-70 Special Termination Costs. 
(a) The clause at 252.249-7000, Special Termination Costs, may be used in an 
incrementally funded contract when its use is approved by the agency head. 
(b) The clause is authorized when— 
(1) The contract term is two years or more; 
(2) The contract is estimated to require— 
(i) Total RDT&E financing in excess of $25 million; or 
(ii) Total production investment in excess of $100 million; and 
(3) Adequate funds are available to cover the contingent reserve liability for 
special termination costs. 
(c) The contractor and the contracting officer must agree upon an amount that 
represents their best estimate of the total special termination costs to which the 
contractor would be entitled in the event of termination of the contract. Insert this 
amount in paragraph I of the clause. 
(d)   (1) Consider substituting an alternate paragraph I for paragraph I of the basic 
clause when— 
(i) The contract covers an unusually long performance period; or 
(ii) The contractor’s cost risk associated with contingent special 
termination costs is expected to fluctuate extensively over the period 
of the contract. 
(2) The alternate paragraph I should provide for periodic negotiation and 
adjustment of the amount reserved for special termination costs. Occasions 
for periodic adjustment may include— 
(i) The Government’s incremental assignment of funds to the contract;  
(ii) The time when certain performance milestones are accomplished by 
the contractor; or 
(iii) Other specific time periods agreed upon by the contracting officer and 
the contractor.  
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A review of the DFARS clause reveals that the clause may be used on incrementally 
funded contracts when: the contract term is two years or longer and is estimated to require in 
excess of $25 million of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds or a total 
of over $100 million of production investment.    
Incrementally funded contracts are those contracts in which funds are incrementally 
obligated throughout the period of performance.  Typically, cost reimbursement RDT&E 
contracts are incrementally funded and require the use of the Limitation of Funds Clause at FAR 
52.232-22.  This clause requires the contractor to notify the Contracting Officer in writing 
whenever it has reason to believe the cost it expects to incur in the next 60 days, when added to 
all costs previously incurred, will exceed 75% of the total amount allotted on the contract (DoD, 
2006b, 52.232-22). 
Another requirement of the Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC) is that there will be 
adequate funds available to cover the contingent reserve liability for special termination costs.   
In addition, the clause states that the contractor and the contracting officer must agree 
upon an amount that represents their best estimate of the total special termination costs to 
which the contractor would be entitled in the event of termination of the contract.  These special 
termination costs are identified within the DFARS in the actual Special Termination Costs clause 
as follows: 
252.249-7000 Special Termination Costs. 
As prescribed in 249.501-70, use the following clause: 
SPECIAL TERMINATION COSTS (DEC 1991) 
(a) Definition. “Special termination costs,” as used in this clause, means only costs in the 
following categories as defined in Part 31 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR)— 
(1) Severance pay, as provided in FAR 31.205-6(g); 
(2) Reasonable costs continuing after termination, as provided in FAR 31.205-
42(b); 
(3) Settlement of expenses, as provided in FAR 31.205-42(g); 
(4) Costs of return of field service personnel from sites, as provided in FAR 
31.205-35 and FAR 31.205-46I; and 
(5) Costs in paragraphs (a)(1), (2), (3), and (4) of this clause to which 
subcontractors may be entitled in the event of termination. 
(b) Notwithstanding the Limitation of Cost/Limitation of Funds clause of this contract, the 
Contractor shall not include in its estimate of costs incurred or to be incurred, any 
amount for special termination costs to which the Contractor may be entitled in the 
event this contract is terminated for the convenience of the Government. 
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(c) The Contractor agrees to perform this contract in such a manner that the Contractor’s 
claim for special termination costs will not exceed $________. The Government shall 
have no obligation to pay the Contractor any amount for the special termination costs 
in excess of this amount. 
(d) In the event of termination for the convenience of the Government, this clause shall 
not be construed as affecting the allowability of special termination costs in any 
manner other than limiting the maximum amount of the costs payable by the 
Government. 
(e) This clause shall remain in full force and effect until this contract is fully funded.  (End 
of clause)(DoD, 2006a, 252.249-7000)  
Thus, the Special Termination Cost Clause limits the amount of special termination (as 
agreed between the government and the contractor) costs that the Government is liable for in a 
Termination for Convenience.  It should be noted that the STC clause does not apply to the 
regular termination costs as outlined in FAR 31.205-42.   
 Agency Approval for STCC 
As stated in the DFARS clause, the use of the STC clause is subject to approval of the 
agency head.  A review of the various agency FAR supplements provides some perspective on 
how this approval is obtained. 
The Air Force FAR supplement at AFFARS 5349.501-70 provides additional and specific 
policy related to the use of the Special Termination Cost Clause.  AFFARS 5349.501-70 
specifically states the following: 
5349.501-70 Special termination costs. 
(a) Contracting officers shall refer to Volume 2A, Chapter 1, Section 010213, paragraph 
C.2 of DoD 7000.14-R, DoD Financial Management Regulation, for Congressional 
notification and additional approval requirements for Special Termination Cost 
Clauses (STCCs). Because STCCs require special notification to Congress and 
entail a long approval process over which the Air Force has little control, the 
contracting officer should allow SAF/AQCK sufficient time to process requests to use 
DFARS 252.249-7000, Special Termination Costs (i.e., not less than 90 days prior to 
contract award). The request shall include the following: 
(i) A detailed breakdown of applicable cost categories in the clause at DFARS 
252.249-7000 (a)(1) through (5), which includes the reasons for the 
anticipated incurrence of the costs in each category; 
(ii) Information on the financial and program need for the clause, including an 
assessment of the contractor’s financial position and the impact of a failure to 
receive authority to use the clause; and 
(iii) Clear evidence that only costs that arise directly from a termination would be 
compensated under the clause. Costs that would be incurred by the 
Government, regardless of whether a termination occurs, shall not be covered 
by an STCC. 
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(b) The contracting officer shall obtain SAF/FM approval prior to authorizing any 
increase in the Government’s maximum liability under the clause. (Air Force, 2006, 
5349.501-70) 
The AFFARS is the only agency-level FAR guidance that gives more specific instruction 
on the coordination and review process, as well as on the Congressional notification 
requirement for the use of STCCs.  This guidance also identifies the requirement for referencing 
the DoD Financial Management Regulations (FMR) for specific notification and approval 
requirements. 
 Statutory Waiver 
The second exception to the Termination Liability funding policy is the Statutory Waiver.  
This exception is explained in the FMR as follows: 
Statutory Waivers. If a program is exempted by Public Law from the requirement to 
budget for Termination Liability, the fiscal year increments may be budgeted on a pay-
as-you-go basis, providing only sufficient funds to cover the disbursements expected to 
be made in that fiscal year. When this situation arises, however, the budget exhibits for 
the program shall clearly indicate the value of the unfunded Termination Liability by year 
for the current year, budget year, and the outyears covered by the FYDP. (DoD, 2006c) 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the regulatory and policy guidance pertaining 
to the funding of Termination Liability and the use of STCCs is found in two different functionally 
oriented regulations—the Financial Management Regulation (FMR) and the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR).  This regulatory guidance on budgeting for Contract Termination Liability from 
two different functional areas of DoD acquisition increases the potential for different 
interpretations or even misinterpretation of the DoD policy.  These differences in policy 
interpretation are reflected in the practices and procedures used by the various DoD services.   
Observations and Findings 
The researchers conducted interviews with various DoD program management offices 
and analyzed samples of DoD contracts related to the management of Termination Liability.  
Based on these reviews, interviews, and analyses, the research team identified the following 
observations and findings: 
1.  Inconsistent Approach 
There is an inconsistent approach among the various military and DoD agencies to 
managing Termination Liability funds on contracts.  Although all program offices that were 
interviewed in this research manage Termination Liability based on the funds obligated on 
contract, the procedures used for ensuring the obligated funds are adequate and sufficient to 
cover Termination Liability expense at any point during the contract period of performance 
varied.  Some program offices maintained close coordination with their contractors to monitor 
and ensure sufficient obligated funds to cover estimated Termination Liability expenses 
throughout the contract period, while other program offices depended solely on the contractor to 
monitor the obligated funds to ensure sufficient coverage for Termination Liability.  Some 
program offices conducted periodical “budget drills” to determine if the amount of obligated 
funds at any given time would be sufficient to cover the estimated Termination Liability at that 
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point in time.  Some program offices used the Contractor Funds Status Report (CFSR) as an aid 
in monitoring the estimated Termination Liability expenses.      
2.  Diffused Guidance 
The regulatory and policy guidance pertaining to Termination Liability are diffused 
between the Federal Management Regulation (FMR) and the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR).  The FMR is the main source of financial management policy and guidance used by DoD 
financial and budget managers, while the FAR is the main source for contract management 
policy and guidance used almost exclusively by DoD contracting officers.  These two 
functionally based regulations lead to differing interpretations of policy, guidance, and 
procedures related to the management of Termination Liability by the financial-management 
and contract-management functional areas.  
3.  Insufficient Databases 
There is no DoD-wide, Service-wide, Command-wide, or Center-wide database; yet, one 
is needed to conduct a proper analysis to determine the total number of contracts that require 
funding for Termination Liability, the total amount of Termination Liability funding on these 
contracts, the total number of contracts containing a Special Termination Cost (STC) clause, 
and the total amount of estimated Termination Liability expenses being managed at the Service 
levels because of these STC clauses.  These databases would provide the data that would be 
considered a critical part of the business case needed to calculate the extent of the funding 
being budgeted for Termination Liability expenses. 
4.  Declining Acceptability of Special Termination Cost Clause 
Because of the current acquisition climate of defense acquisition program cost overruns 
and schedule delays, the increased use of the current Special Termination Cost Clause (STCC) 
would not be well received by the Congress or the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  
Furthermore, program managers are not necessarily receptive to requesting approval of a 
STCC from their higher headquarters.   
Alternative Approaches to Funding Termination Liability 
Our research identified the following alternative approaches to managing and funding 
contract termination Liability. 
1.  Impose a “Tax” on All Programs Subject to Termination Liability for the 
Purpose of Establishing an Insurance Fund to Cover Termination Liability. 
The advantages of this alternative include the benefit for program managers of not 
having to commit funds to cover TL, thus allowing better use of funds for program execution.  
Additionally, since the required Termination Liability funds would be identified prior to any 
termination, any concerns for possible Anti-deficiency Act violations should subside.  Finally, for 
the Military department, significantly fewer dollars would be tied up unproductively for TL and 
would be available for program execution. 
The disadvantages of this option include the fact that those programs not at risk for 
termination would have to pay this TL tax, thus decreasing their amount of budget for executing 
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the program.  For not-at-risk programs, this tax would make program management more 
difficult. The dollars associated with this tax would not be available until late in the fiscal year if 
they were not used to cover a termination; if they were used to cover a termination, the program 
would lose the money permanently—presenting a lose-lose proposition for the program 
manager.  Finally, another disadvantage would be that at-risk programs would not have the 
funds required to pay for the tax available for program execution, thus, putting these programs 
at an increased disadvantage. 
Some of the potential questions related to this alternative include the following: 
 Who determines the “tax”? Those programs at greatest risk should logically be taxed 
more than those programs not at risk.  
 Who determines the risk of a possible program termination? 
 Would the insurance fund provide an attractive target for Congressional rescissions as 
well as Department reprogrammings? 
 When and how would the unused portion of the funds be returned to the programs? 
2.  Allow Coverage of Termination Liability to be Assumed at the Major Command 
or PEO Level. 
One advantage of this alternative is that program managers could use all of the funds 
appropriated for their programs for program execution.  Additionally, the use of STCCs with the 
associated Congressional notification would not be required.  Another advantage of this 
approach is that the uncertainty of fund availability (as opposed to the tax approach) would be 
eliminated.  Finally, there would not be a pot of funds to be targeted by Congress or the 
Department. 
The disadvantages of this option include the fact that this approach is similar to the 
STCC approach—which has not enjoyed strong support from the OMB or the Congress.  
Additionally, concerns regarding possible Anti-deficiency Act violations would likely increase.  
Finally, another disadvantage would include the fact that paying for a program’s termination 
costs would likely adversely impact other programs. 
Some of the potential issues related to this alternative include the following: 
 This approach would appear to the OMB and Congress as an attempt to forego 
budgeting for Termination Liability. 
 A program termination late in the fiscal year could be difficult to fund. Above-threshold 
reprogramming requests are rarely certain or timely. 
3.  Increase the Use of Special Termination Cost Clauses (STCC) 
The advantages of this alternative include the benefit that program managers would be 
able to use all of the funds appropriated for their programs for program execution.  The 
uncertainty of fund availability (as opposed to in the tax approach) would be eliminated for 
program managers. 
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The disadvantages of this option include the fact that Congress and the OMB have 
already exhibited a lack of enthusiasm for the increased use of STCCs.  Additionally, the 
paperwork involved with STCCs is considered onerous by the programs that have completed it. 
Recommendations 
Based on the research findings, the following recommendations are provided. 
1.  Remove ambiguity and improve consistency in the regulations.   
The current regulations pertaining to the management of contract termination lend 
themselves to differing and inconsistent interpretations among the Services and functional areas 
(program management, financial management, and contract management).  If the “liberal” 
interpretation of current regulations is different from what is desired or is the intent of the 
agencies, these regulations should be revised to remove any ambiguity and to improve the 
consistency between the functional areas.   
2.  Do not impose a tax system to provide funding for potential Termination 
Liability. 
The taxing of program offices for the purpose of generating a pool of funds to use for 
Termination Liability results in a lose-lose proposition for program offices and may result in more 
disadvantages than advantages.  In addition, the potential issues related to this alternative 
would require additional research and analysis. 
3.  Continue to use STCCs for the larger programs with funding or longevity 
concerns. 
For larger, major defense acquisition programs that have a lower probability of 
termination due to visibility, political ties, or urgency of need, the DoD should continue to 
support the use of STCCs to allow for greater use of program funds for program execution. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to explore current Department of Defense 
mechanisms for addressing Contract Termination Liability, review current practices and 
procedures for funding and managing Termination Liability, and propose alternative approaches 
to improve the DoD’s ability to manage Termination Liability and its effect on defense acquisition 
programs.  This research reviewed the regulatory and policy guidance on Contract Termination 
Liability.  A review of current practices and procedures for funding and managing Termination 
Liability was conducted based on interviews and document reviews with the Air Force, Navy, 
and other various DoD agencies.  Program management challenges and preliminary 
observations and findings were then presented.  A discussion of alternative approaches to 
funding Termination Liability was discussed, including the use of Special Termination Cost 
Clauses (STCC).  Finally, recommendations were presented. 
The regulations and policies pertaining to the management and funding of Contract 
Termination Liability are inconsistent and subject to interpretation.  Program managers, finance 
and budget managers, and contracting officers have differing interpretations of the requirement 
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for funding Termination Liability.  Furthermore, the practices and procedures used in defense 
acquisition program offices reflect this inconsistency. 
In addition, the probability that a government contract will be terminated for convenience 
is very small. Program managers and contractors are aware of the statistics, and their approach 
to Termination Liability reflects that knowledge. The normal procedure for handling the potential 
liability associated with a contract terminated for convenience is to “budget” for the liability. 
Then, in coordination with the contractor, the required amount of funding is tracked on a regular 
basis. In this case, budgeting for Termination Liability does not mean obligating funds 
specifically for that purpose.  
Additionally, program managers are not in favor of a “tax” that would negate the 
requirement to budget for TL. For the most part, they are satisfied with the status quo because 
the procedure they currently use to handle TL allows them to keep all of the funding 
appropriated for their program. A tax would deprive them of funds they currently have at their 
disposal. In fact, a program that has funding problems could be put in jeopardy by having to 
relinquish funding to pay for a tax. Program managers feel as though the statistics support their 
current approach. 
Furthermore, if all programs were taxed, there is a general concern that the pooled funds 
would likely be lost for good—either the military Departments (or DoD) would use them to solve 
other problems if they were not required to cover a liability, or Congress would look upon the 
funds that had been set aside as a “slush fund” and be tempted to use them elsewhere.  
Also, support for increased use of STCCs is not evident, either at the program level or 
the OMB or Congressional level. Congress has expressed its concern regarding STCCs through 
report language. OMB correspondence has indicated that support for more than one STCC per 
service is unlikely.  However, it should be noted that those programs that have significant 
funding problems and/or are concerned about the possibilities of termination do support 
additional use of STCCs. In fact, these programs would prefer to have a STCC that covers more 
cost elements than the standard STCC. 
Finally, this research recommended that the Department of Defense: remove the 
ambiguity and improve the consistency in the regulations pertaining to the management of 
Termination Liability, not impose a tax system to provide funding for potential Termination 
Liability, and continue to use STCCs for the larger programs with funding or longevity concerns. 
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